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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Appellant,
vs.
Case No.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Respondent.

8442

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of
Review of the Industrial Commission affirming a written
opinion of L. Stanford Wooten, Appeals Referee of the
Department of Employment Security, which held plaintiff
responsible for payment of unemployment compensation
taxes based on the earnings of drivers who leased cabs from
Salt Lake Transportation Company.
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For many years, Salt Lake Transportation Company
has held nontransferable franchises from the Utah Public
Service Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission and
Salt Lake City to operate taxicabs, known as Yell ow Cabs,
in Salt Lake City and surrounding areas. It owns and
maintains taxicabs and prior to 1\larch 1, 1955, employed
drivers on a commision basis to operate its cabs, paying
unemployment compensation taxes on such wages. Because
of competitive conditions, on March 1, 1955, the company
changed its method of operation. Since that da~e, cabs have
been leased to drivers under the lease agreement set out
in the Record, pp. 10-12. No wages are paid to the drivers.
The drivers pay a daily rental for the cabs (R. 10, 21-22)
and collect and retain all fares received from the customers
without any accounting therefor to the company. (R. 26).
The company leases its cabs for either 6, 10 or 12 hours
at a specified rental. In addition, the drivers keep a deposit
of $15.00 with the company to insure payment of rental
and agree to be responsible for damage to the cabs up to
$50.00, to obey all federal, state and municipal laws, to
accept the cab assigned by the company and not allow the
cab to be driven by others (R. 10-11). Ordinary upkeep
and maintenance of the cabs is the responsibility of the
company (R. 11). The company provides a garage, maintains taxicab stands and furnishes a telephone and radio
dispatching service. Public liability insurance is kept by
the company. The only compensation received by the company for the cab and accompanying services is the specified
rental plus whatever gas is purchased by the drivers from
the company (the gas is sold at a discount) (R. 21-22).
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Except in the case of irregular drivers (R. 24), the
particular time when the cab is to be used by the driver
is determined by mutual agreement and a so-called shift
agreement (R. 13) is signed by the driver and made a part
of the rental agreement. Each driver is furnished a short
booklet giving certain advice and suggestions to the drivers
(R. 18). These suggestions are not regulations of the
company and there is no provision in the rental agreement
or any other agreement between the company and the driver
that requires the driver to conform to the recommendations
and suggestions contained in the pamphlet. Since March
1, 1955, when the leasing arrangement was initiated, the
labor union to which most of the drivers had theretofore
belonged, has been dissolved and the company now has no
contract with any labor union (R. 25).
When the company submitted its. first quarter 1955
unemployment compensation report, no wages. were reported for the drivers for the month of March. The company noted on the report "No taxicab drivers were employed
during March. Taxicabs were leased to drivers". The
Department of Employment Security thereupon investigated
and on June 16, 1955, determined that the company should
have reported "wages" of the drivers and made an order
to that effect (R. 1-4). Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed
to the Appeals Referee in the manner prescribed by law, a
hearing was held and a decision was rendered September
2, 1955 (R. 40-44). A further appeal was taken to the
Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security in the manner and within the time prescribed by law.
The Board of Review thereafter considered the case and
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on October 14, 1955, affirmed the decision of the Appeals
Referee (R. 53), whereupon the company appealed to this
court within the time and in the manner prescribed by law.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
It is well settled that what constitutes an employer and
employee under the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act
is determined by the statutory rules alone and not by the
common law definitions of master and servant. Globe Grain
& Milling Co. v. Indus. Com., 98 Utah 36, 91 P. 2d 512, reh.
den., 97 P. 2d 582; Creameries of America v. Indus. Com.,
98 Utah 571, 102 P. 2d 300; Fuller Brush Co. v. Indus. Com.,
99 Utah 97, 104 P. 2d 201, 129 A. L. R. 511; Singer Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Indus. Com., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479, reh.
den., 104 Utah 194, 141 P. 2d 694; Northern Oil Co. v. Indus.
Com., 104 Utah 353, 140 P. 2d 329. These statutory rules are
found in Sees. 35-4-22 (j) (1) and (5), U. C. A. 1953, and
require a showing, first, that the alleged employee performed services for the alleged employer, second, that such
services were performed for wages or under a contract of
hire and, third, that such serYices for \Yages or under a
contract for hire are not excluded from the operation of the
act by the tests specified in 35-4-22 (j) (5) (A, B & C).
See the above cited cases and in addition National Tunnel
Mines Co. v. Indus. Co1n., 99 Utah 39, 102 P. 2d 508;
Powell v. Indus. Co1n., 116 Utah 385, 210 P. 2d 1006;
Johanson B1"os. Builders v. Bd. of Revieu'~ 118 Utah 384,
222 P. 2d 563; Leach v. Bd. of Ret'ie1c, (Utah), 260 P. 2d
744. We are he·re not concerned with the third element,
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the so-called A, B, C exclusionary test, and will limit our
brief to a discussion of the first two questions, to-wit, did
the lessees of plaintiff's cabs perform services for plaintiff
and, if so, were such services performed for wages?

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE LESSEES OF PLAINTIFF'S CABS DID
NOT PERFORM SERVICES FOR PLAINTIFF.

POINT II
THE LESSEES OF PLAINTIFF'S CABS DID
NOT RECEIVE WAGES FROM PLAINTIFF.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LESSEES OF PLAINTIFF'S CABS DID
NOT PERFORM SERVICES FOR PLAINTIFF.
It has been recognized by this Court as well as the
courts of other jurisdictions that service performed essentially for one's self is not service performed for an employer
covered by the act. The most common instances of such
a situation are where a sale or a lease is involved. Thus
a Fuller Brush salesman was held not covered by the Act
since he purchased the products he sold from the company
and thereafter worked free from control of the company.
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Fuller Brush Co. v. Indus. Com., supra. It has also been
recognized that a lessor-lessee relationship is not a service
relationship under the Act (National Tunnel Mines Co. v.
Indus. Com., supra; Combined Metals Reduction Co. v.
Indus. Com., 101 Utah 230, 116 P. 2d 929; Powell v.
Indus. Com., supra) although in none of these cases did
the facts show such a relationship. The exclusion of lessees
from the coverage of the Act has also been recognized and
applied in other jurisdictions. See Anno. 152 A. L. R. 520,
164 A. L. R. 1411, 10 A. L. R. 2d 369.
In Magruder v. YeUow Cab Co., (C. C. A. 4th 1944),
141 F. 2d 324, 152 A. L. R. 516, affirming 49 F. Supp. 605,
the precise question here involved was discussed. There,
as here, the company leased cabs to drivers at a flat rate
per day. The driver collected and retained all fares and
made no accounting therefor. Drivers were free _to drive
where and when they wished within the city limits, but
were required to obey all laws and regulations concerning
the operation of taxicabs. Public liability insurance was
maintained by the company. The court held this relationship to be merely a lease and not an employment under
the Social Security Act.
In U. S. v. Davis, (C. A. Dist. Col., 1946), 154 F. 2d
314, the same result 'vas reached. The facts were virtually
identical to the facts in the Yellow Cab case and this case.
It should be noted that the Davis case involved a company
who, like plaintiff, maintained a central switchboard for
the convenience of its lessees, restricted use of the cabs to
the city limits and required lessees to keep trip records as
provided by law.
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See also New Deal Cab Co. v. Fahs, (C. A. 5th, 1949),
174 F. 2d 318; Economy Cab Co. v. Fahs, (C. A. 5th, 1949),
174 F. 2d 321; and Co-op Cab Co. v. Allen, (D. C. Ga.,
1947), 82 F. Supp. 695.
In the case of Jones v. Goodson, (C. C. A. lOth, 1941),
121 F. 2d 176, the 1Oth Circuit reached a contrary result
because the control of the lessees was much greater. The
drivers were required to buy all oil and gas from the company, were subject to discharge at will for disorderliness,
violation of city ordinances or overcharging. The drivers
were required to inform the company of their whereabouts
at least once each hour. Such strict control was held to
create an employment situation.
The Goodson case was distinguished in both the Yellow
Cab and Davis cases and in the later lOth Circuit case of
Woods v. Z..licholas, (C. C. A. lOth, 1947), 163 F. 2d 615.
In the Nicholas case, the court emphasized that the taxpayer "did not have any right of control in respect to the
method and manner in which [the lessees] did their work."
Among other things, the lessee was not controlled as to
where or when he drove, was paid no wage by the taxpayer
and received and retained all fares from customers without
accountability. "[The taxpayer] merely furnished the
license and certificate of convenience and necessity, as well
as certain facilities, for which he was compensated [by the
lessee-drivers]." In holding that an employment relationship did not exist, the court did not apply the common law
principles of master-servant, but treated the question as
being governed by the purposes sought to be accomplished

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
by the Social Security Act, that is, a statutory definition
rather than a common law definition of employee was used.
That lack of control is an important element in determining the existence of a service or non-service relationship
is established by the decisions of this court. Fuller Brush
Co. v. Indus. Com., supra; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Indus.
Com., supra; National Tunnel Mines Co. v. Ind. Com.,
supra (where a lessor-lessee relationship was involved);
Powell v. Ind. Com., supra. Note particularly Justice Wolfe's
concurrence in Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Ind. Com.,
supra, where a detailed analysis of the elements of control
was made.
The Appeals Referee conceded that "the company has
sincerely attempted to reduce to a minimum the element of
control in the performance of the service," (R. 43), yet
implied that control was still present in that the company
assigned vehicles, assigned shifts and required reports. An
identical contention was made in Party Cab Co. v. U. S.,
(C. A. 7th, 1949), 172 F. 2d 87, 10 A. L. R. 2d 358, a Social
Security case. In answer, the court stated (10 A. L. R. 2d
at 366) :
"The weakness of this argument on control lies
in the fact that the elements relied upon by the
Board are matters '""hich concern the plaintiff's
business rather than the serYices performed by the
drivers. The matter of control 'vhich is material
is that 'vhich the plaintiff exercised over the drivers
during the period they were in possession of the
cabs rather than what the plaintiff might do either
prior or subsequent to such period. Considered in
this light, any control exercised by the plaintiff was
quite meagre."
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Similarly, the company here exercises an extremely
limited control of the drivers while they are in possession
of the cabs. They are not required to wear uniforms, nor
to remain at any specified place (Rental Agreement, Par.
6d, R. 12). So far as the company is ·concerned, the drivers
can choose the most likely spot within the city for customers, leaving other cab stations unattended (R. 29, 30).
The drivers are not required to accept any calls (Rental
Agreement, Par. 6c, R. 12). They are not required to avail
themselves of the telephone and radio dispatching service
of the company (R. 22, 29). They may drive or not drive
during the period of the lease, or for that matter, can use
the cabs for their own personal use rather than in the
carriage of pasengers. They are not required to obey any
rules and regulations of the company, although they are
required to attend safety meetings. (However, such meetings are not, in fact, held, R. 27.) They are not required
to purchase gasoline from the company, although they
agree to do so whenever possible. They are not required
to accept a shift assignment. That is a matter arrived at
by mutual agreement (R. 23). They are required to obey
the laws and regulations of the federal, city and state governments with respect to the operation of the taxicabs ;
yet that is a requirement imposed by operation of law,
binding upon them regardless of any specification in the
Rental Agreement. The only real limitation on the drivers
while they are in possession of the cab is the restriction
on out-of-town trips; yet this is merely a reasonable restriction to safeguard the company's ownership of the cab
similar to the common provisions in conditional sales con-
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tracts that the vehicle will not be taken outside the state.
It should be noted that out-of-town is not merely outside
the city limits, but a trip of 15 miles outside the city limits.
Thus in practical operation, the driver is able to serve the
principal area of business, that is, Salt Lake City and its
suburbs, and will be governed by the restriction only in the
rare case where a customer requires transportation for a
greater distance.
Consideration should also be given to the fact that the
company, under this method of operation, has no contract
whatsoever with the customers who use the cabs. The drivers are not fulfilling a contract between the customers and
the company as was the case in Singer Sewing Machine v.
Indus. Com., supra; Creameries of America v. Indus. Com.,
supra; Salt Lake Tribune v. Indus. Com., 99 Utah 259, 102
P. 2d 307; and Leach v. Bd. of Review, supra. Here the
drivers themselves contract with the customers and the
company has nothing to do with either the initiation or
performance of such contracts.
The Appeals Referee emphasized that the advertising
of cab service was done by the company and in the name
of the company, and that the driver had nothing to do with
this nor received any benefit from it. Certainly, more
people are likely to use a Yell ow Cab as opposed to some
other cab after an advertising campaign is carried on and
certainly this will benefit the drivers by increased patronage and thus increased driver profits. Such an arrangement can make no difference to . the relationship of the
parties. Indeed, it has the effect of confirming a more
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definite lessor-lessee relationship. As stated by the District
Court in Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 F. Supp. at 609:
"The cab company's public advertisements, uniform color scheme and maintenance of call boxes
were an effective means of making popular its cabs
and thereby enabling it to lease or hire them to
drivers on terms it deemed satisfactory." (emphasis
added.)
See also Martin

v. Wichita Cab Co., 161 Kan. 510, 170 P. 2d

147 at 152.
In essence the business of the company has in fact
changed from a business of providing taxicab service to
the public to a business of leasing cabs to drivers who may
or may not provide such service as their self-interest dictates. The Appeals Referee seemed to assume that because
the city license and certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Public Service Commission is held by
the company and is nontransferable, that the company could
not change its business to that of leasing cabs. Such an
argument ignores the actual facts of the situation. It is
basically irrelevant~ for the question to be determined here
is the relationship between the company and the drivers,
not the relationship between the company and the city and
state. The company-driver relationship depends on the
contract between the parties. Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co.,
141 F. 2d 324 at 326, 152 A. L. R. 516 at 520. As was stated
in Parks Cab Co. v. Annunzio, 412 Ill. 549, 107 N. E. 2d
853 at 855:
"The Unemployment Compensation Act deals
with realities of economic life. It is with these
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same realities that we are concerned in determining
questions which arise in the course of its administration. Issues as to status are determined by applying the terms of the statute to the facts as they
exist * * *."
and further,

"* * * the fact that the contract may have
violated the city ordinances is not determinative of
the actual relationship between Parks Cab and its
drivers. We need not and do not decide whether
there has been, in fact, a violation here. * * *
In our view economic facts as they actually exist
are determinative here."
Even if the company is still considered to be in the
taxicab business, that fact can make no difference to the
relationship between the drivers and the company for this
taxicab business can be operated by drivers who are not
employees. As the court in New Deal Cab Company v.
Fahs, supra, stated:
"But it is undeniable that the company itself
was running a business of carrying passengers for
hire rather than the mere casual rental of cars; for
it had a city license so to do, and there would be
little demand for its cars otherwise. But it could, if
it chose, get the work done by independent contractors instead of by hired employees. This is in effect
what it did, but in a very loose wa.y, because tke
drivers did not exp'ressly agree to accornplish tkis
work. Self interest alone seems to have been relied
on, for hauling passengers would be the driver's
best source to make money, and to meet his positive
obligation to pay rental and for gasoline." (emphasis added.)
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The Appeals Referee also considered that a service
relationship existed because the lease was. not a lease of
specific property, that is, a particular cab was not leased
but merely any cab available and assigned to the driver
by the company. With all due respect to the Referee, we
are unable to agree with this contention. Concededly, a
true lease is not involved here for the correct nomenclature
for a lease of personal property is a bailment (Wasatch
Livestock Loan Co. v. Nielson, 90 Utah 331, 61 P. 2d 616
at 619), but there is no requirement that a bailment be for
a specific piece of property. A bailment is merely a transfer
of possession of personal property to be used by the transferee temporarily and returned by him in accordance with
his agreement with the transferor. It could certainly not
be contended that the lease of a "drive-it-yourself" car was
any the less a lease because a specific car was not agreed
upon in advance. Customers of such a business rent a car
of a certain type or sometimes of a certain make, but rarely
designate a specific car which they will lease. Similarly,
the driver leases the use of a cab and when that cab is
transferred to him he has a well established property right
in the cab for the period of the bailment or lease. No such
question has ever been raised in any of the cases concerning the question of employment as defined in the Social
Security Act or Unemployment Compensation Acts. Indeed,
such contracts have specifically been characterized as bailments. See Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, where the
court said:
"vVe see in this contract the hired use of a thing,
the classical bailment known as locatio rei, only that
and nothing more."
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See also Martin

v. Wichita Cab Co., supra.

Should this court affirm the decision of the Department
of Employment Security, a very unusual situation will exist.
The Industrial Commission has already determined that
the rental arrangement under which the company is now
leasing cabs does not make the drivers employees of the
company under the W orkmens' Compensation Act. (Bacell
0. Angell v. Salt Lake Transportation Company, Claim No.
5618, R. 14-17). To the same effect are RockefeUer v. Industrial Commission, (Utah), 197 Pac. 1038 and Rose v.
Black & White Cab Co., (Ark., 1953), 258 S. W. 2d 50. Is
it not an anomalous situation, therefore, to require the company to provide unemployment benefits to the drivers and
yet not compensate the same drivers in case they are injured or killed in the course of their driving? If public
policy is to be considered, certainly the preference should
be given to compensation for injury or death, rather than
to compensation for mere unemployment.
Apart from this situation, the Department of Employment Security will itself be in a difficult position should
the driver-lessees be considered 'vithin the Act. How will
they determine, for example, \Vhether a driver is entitled
to benefits when he voluntarily refuses to sign a rental
agreement on the company's terms or "~in he be considered
unemployed only when the company refuses to renew the
rental agreement? Even in the latter situation, the discontinuance of the agreement is for good cause-the driver's breach of contract.
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POINT II
THE LESSEES OF PLAINTIFF'S CABS DID
NOT RECEIVE WAGES FROM PLAINTIFF.

As previously stated, the drivers who lease cabs from
the plaintiff pay plaintiff a flat rate per 6, 10 or 12 hour
period. The company at no time pays the drivers. anything,
nor do they pay any obligations of the driver which could
be considered a constructive payment. The entire consideration received for the driver's services is. paid by the
customers who use the cabs. The entire risk of profit and
loss from the operation of the cabs is solely and exclusively
on the drivers. If they do not haul enough customers to
pay their rental and gas costs, they lose money. To the
extent that their earnings exceed the rental and gas costs,
they make a profit. This cannot be considered wages paid
by the plaintiff.
In Fuller Brush Company v. Indus. Com., supra, this
court defined wages as used in the Unemployment Compensation Act. It was stated there :
"But it is not all personal service performed
for another that comes within the act, but only such
as is performed 'for wages or under any contract of
hire.' 'Wages' is defined as all compensation payable
for personal services, rendered for another under a
contract of hire, express or implied. This compensation is based upon and computed upon service rendered, and is not derived from the accomplishment
of a purpose or achievement of an objective, by the
person receiving the remuneration, through a difference in two prices. The essential elements of
wages are that they form a direct obligation against
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the employer, in favor of the employee; that when
the service is performed the compensation, if any,
accrues and becomes payable regardless of the success or failure of the undertaking; that any profits
or earning over and above costs of the service accrues to the employer, and any loss as a result of the
undertaking or service must be borne by the em..
ployer. It is not essential that the wage move directly from the employer to the employee, as where
the employee works on commissions, deducts his
commission from a collection and remits the 'nets',
but it is essential that the remuneration accrues
from the product or service of the employer, and
would accrue to him except for the fact that the
employee is entitled to retain or receive it as remuneration under his contract of hire. The term
'contract of hire' is not defined in the act probably
because the legislature felt that the expression was
so well established, understood and definite, that it
needs no further amplification or exposition. It is
used in its common meaning and acceptation. It is
an agreement 'vhereby one undertakes or obligates
himself to render personal service for another for
a remuneration to be paid because the service was
rendered, regardles of the element of profit or loss
resulting from the work, endeavor. or undertaking."
(emphasis added.)
Here there is no obligation of the plaintiff to pay the
drivers anything "~hatsoever. The success or failure of
the undertaking is dependent upon the ability of the driver
to carry a sufficient number of passengers to make a profit
over his costs. None of this profit accrues to the plaintiff
and the entire loss is the responsibility of the driver. The
"essential elen1ents of "rages" as defined in the Fuller Brush
case are not present here. We do not here contend that
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merely because no ren1uneration passes directly from the
plaintiff to the drivers that no wages are paid, for in certain circumstances a third person can pay the "wages"
without affecting the employment status under the Act.
See Creameries of America v. Indus. Com., supra, and Salt
Lake Tribune v. Indus. Com., supra. We do contend, how. ever, that where the compensation is paid by a third person
to the alleged employee, where the risk of profit or loss is
exclusively on the "employee" and where the "employer"
receives no part of such compensation, that wages are not
paid within the meaning of the Act.
Of equal importance, perhaps, is the fact that the
drivers are not accountable to the plaintiff for the fares
they collect. How, then, is the plaintiff to determine what
the "wages" of the drivers are so that it can pay the unemployment compensation tax? Certainly, it is not fair or
proper to do as the Departn1ent of Employment Security
did and pick a wage figure out of thin air. See the letter
of June 16, 1955, to the plaintiff (R. 1-4) where, on page
2, the writer stated, "However, the company had no record
of the earnings of such drivers so it was necessary to arbitrarily arrive at an equitable wage figure. The total number of hours the cabs were leased was divided by 8 to
determine the number of 8-hour shifts and an average earning computed at $6.00 per 8-hour shift."
Thus, the Department assumed each lessee made a
profit of $6.00 every eight hours, despite the undisputed
evidence that the profits of drivers fluctuated from time
to time (R. 26) and that the company has no way of determining the amount of fares collected (R. 26). It is no
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answer to say, as the Appeals Referee did, that the com.
pany "could if it so ·chose again determine the amount of
such remuneration as it did in the past". The company
cannot so choose for, like the drivers, it is bound by the
rental agreement which does not require drivers to account
for the fares they collect. To collect a tax based on such an
arbitrary figure is erroneous, unjust and unlawful.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we contend that the decision of the Appeals Referee is not supported by the evidence
but, on the contrary, the evidence shows as a matter of
law that the drivers who lease cabs from the Salt Lake
Transportation Company are not performing services for
nor receiving wages from the company within the meaning of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act.

Respectfully submitted,

ATHOL RAWLINS,
H. R. V\'ALDO, JR.,
OF RAY, RAWLINS,
JONES & HENDERSON,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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